Turning the Tide

Open Dialogue on ‘Religion in Political Polarization: Currents in the Netherlands and Indonesia’

June Beckx

In recent years, Indonesia and the Netherlands have seen increasing polarization along similar patterns: the populism of controversial figures who later emerged victorious in parliamentary elections in the Netherlands and presidential elections in Indonesia. In the Netherlands, strong (anti-) religious sentiments, in this case Islamic, were exploited, while in Indonesia the strong religious tendencies that had previously been gratefully exploited to attract voters were now almost entirely absent.

That is why NICMCR was challenged to take up this disturbing phenomenon as part of its annual event on 2 November 2024.

Contrary to the nature of the topic, the Open Dialogue took place in the cool and beautiful new building of Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama (UNU) Yogyakarta, an Institution that came as the newest Participant and immediately agreed to provide its venue for the event.

Populism

In general, it can be said that populism polarises society and undermines democracy. It creates two opposing poles, us and them, the people and the elite, the exclusive believers and the inclusive believers, etc. etc. It pits values, race, religion against each other, all with the aim of favouring the populist in question and his followers. According to Dr. Martijn de Koning, populism is a political style that can be used by any political party, in close interaction with the socio-political context in which it finds itself.

Usually promoted by the extreme right, the concept of the people is an idealised one: real Europeans, real and hard-working Dutch, white, Christian, the ordinary people who really belong in our country. In this case, the will of the people is the central claim of populist parties. Surprisingly, De Koning argues that the biggest threat does not come from this far-right populism, as the line between far-right and centrist parties has become blurred. Items on the far-right agenda, such as attacking the human rights of migrants and blaming Islam and Muslims as a supposedly threatening group, are increasingly being incorporated into centrist politics.

This is acknowledged by Rev. Em. Aart Verburg, whose personal experience upon returning to the Netherlands after a six-month absence, illustrates De Koning’s thesis. Populism, he says, consists largely of nostalgic nationalism; the Netherlands must return to the way it used to be, without migrants, without Muslims. In fact, this nostalgic past is a myth: there have always been problems and misery, threats and challenges. We cannot deny the climate crisis, migration will not stop by building walls at our borders. That is why Verburg claims that Populism is a narrative and, and often it is a false one. Ironically, political narratives do not have to be true or logical to be credible. People have always developed a worldview to give meaning to life. When a particular worldview is collectively adopted, it becomes real and true. It is not the facts that determine reality, but the perception of life. Accentuated by emotions, facts, arguments and morality become less relevant. The only way to reduce these influences is to posit counter narratives.

Looking at the situation in Indonesia, Dr Suhadi Cholil believes that the identification of right-wing populism in Indonesia cannot be separated from religious conservatism. However, this right-wing populism is relatively weak and does not face much opposition from left-wing groups.

According to Suhadi, there are at least three right-wing populist groups worth mentioning in Indonesia. The first is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a movement that appealed to Muslim university students and was present in Indonesia long before the Reformasi-era. The second is the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), whose beliefs are similar to those of mainstream Muslim groups, but with a different political orientation and an often violent approach to other religions. The third is the Party of Prosperous Justice (PKS), the channel of the Muslim Brotherhood (Tarbiyah), which entered Indonesia around the 80s. There is also the Salafi movement, a non-mainstream, rather exclusive Islamic movement. Although they could pose a challenge to tolerance, they are little discussed because of their politically quiet approach. HTI and FPI were both dissolved, while PKS turned into a political party, which now even supports the government.

Nationalism

In the Dialogue, the difference between Indonesia and the Netherlands about nationalism, i.e. the prevailing national feelings, came to the fore. De Koning cites the populist Pim Fortuyn at the turn of the century, who merged liberalism with a racial message on Islam, thereby idealizing the Judeochristian civilization. The hierarchy of Christianity did not refer so much to religion, but more to culture and tradition. It became Us (Christians by tradition) against Them (muslim migrants), thereby sacralizing the majority.

Commenting on Nationalism in the Netherlands, Verburg regrets that the populist movement has stolen the word nationalism, even intoxicated it. The Netherlands was a tolerant nation, open for Muslims and other religions. Now it has changed into an intolerant nation, excluding people who were considered not to ‘belong’ to the ‘people of the Netherlands’ anymore.

In contrast to the meaning of nationalism in the Netherlands, the word has a unifying connotation in Indonesia. While in the NL it evokes an exclusive mix of xenophobia and Islamophobia, in Indonesia it brings together people from different regions and ethnic communities to rekindle the emotion of a unifying struggle against one and the same enemy, the struggle for independence from the Dutch. Sumpah Pemuda, and to some extent Pancasila, symbolises a strong nationalism, a commitment (by the youth) to put the interests of the nation above personal or group interests. A dedication that creates a sense of love for the country and a responsibility to continue to fight for the nation’s progress.

Religion

Suhadi recounts how the face of Islam in Indonesia changed from a ‘smiling Islam’ under a totalitarian ruler, to a religion that contributed to social and identity conflicts, which some observers refer to as inter-religious and inter-ethnic.

An intense debate on Islam in the context of Reformasi led to polarization between liberal Islamic and conservative groups. Transnational movements, suppressed during the New Order, gained notoriety with the first Bali bombing in 2002. In response to the rise of extremism and terrorism, and to curb polarising movements such as 212, in 2019 the Minister of Religious Affairs launched a religious moderation project.

At present, it seems difficult to separate Islam (and possibly other religions) in Indonesia without linking it to politics and the state. The mainstream group (moderate Muslims) consistently adheres to constitutionalism and maintains the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), but at the same time they advocate a closer relationship between the state and religion. They argue that the state should be a shared ‘home’ for all religious people, thereby accepting religious diversity. According to Suhadi, the intervention of the state in religion, or vice versa, has deepened, but represents an inclusive religious orientation

Going back to his thesis that false narratives can only be reduced by alternative narratives, Verburg argues that this counter narrative should stick to the facts and be presented in a non-polarising tone, a narration that eminently moves people. In this postmodern era, Pastoral Care could be that narrative, a narrative of faith on an individual basis. Pastoral care guides people in discovering how God’s story connects with believers’ personal faith story, even to the state where God and people co-author this story. Verburg denotes the story about Joseph and his brothers in Genesis 45, a story of faith which includes change (‘turning the tide for the better’), reconciliation, new hope for the future, concern for the salvation of brothers and sisters and coming generations on this earth, to save their lives through great salvation.

Interesting is the debate on secularization. In the Netherlands, the state guarantees its neutrality through the separation of state and religion. But that does not take away the strict control over informal Islamic education, which actually violates the Constitution. In Indonesia, there is no such separation. Dr. Fredrik Doeka mentioned the state’s inclusive support for non-Islamic Educational Institutes. ‘State theology’ gives him a bitter taste of fascism at the beginning of WW2. To this, Suhadi argued that the concept of the state in Indonesia differs from how Europeans view the state. In the eyes of Muslims in general, the state is there to serve the interest of the people.

Concluding remarks

It is remarkable how concepts like state, nationalism and religion are interpreted and experienced differently in the Netherlands and Indonesia. Often, things that are completely self-evident to the one, turn out to be completely outlandish to the other. The same goes for (exclusive) populism. While in the Netherlands the danger looms from the white majority, in Indonesia it is mainly religious extremism. Targets in the Netherlands are mainly Muslims and migrants, in Indonesia they are mainly ethnic and local (indigenous) communities.

What can we learn from these differences? Prof. Frans Wijsen wonders, for example, about the implications of religious education for the younger generations. He recommends that this should be a topic of ongoing dialogue between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

Dr. Harjani Saptaningtyas makes a surprising observation about environmental issues as ‘the’ language to reduce polarisation. In doing so, she opens up a new perspective on the pioneering role of youth. At the same time, it strengthens interreligious dialogue. At Radboud University, Muslim and secular student organisations are working together to raise awareness of climate change.

Due to lack of time, the role of social media could not be explored further. Using disinformation and hate rhetoric, these online platforms have proven effective in increasing political polarization, undermining democracy, at least in Indonesia. We need to ensure that society, and especially young people become more critical and aware so that they are more resilient to such dangers.